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The determiants of non-performing loans: Do institutions matter? A comparative 
analysis of the MENA and CEE countries 
Semia RACHID 
Abstract 
This paper tries to study the determinants of non-performing loans (NPL) in the Middle East 
and North Africa (MENA) and Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries during the 
1997/2016 period. Our analysis, which is based on different panel data estimation approaches, 
shows that institutions have different effects on the level of NPL in the MENA and the CEE 
countries. We found that institutions (rule of law) increase the level of NPL in the MENA 
countries but they decrease these loans in the CEE countries. This result is attributed to the 
existence of an institutional difference between both samples of countries. In fact, the rise of 
NPL in the CEE countries is attributed to financial development.  On the other hand, the 
global financial crisis (GFC) has an important effect on the accumulation of NPL in the 
MENA countries. However, the relationship between the GFC and the NPL is not significant 
for the CEE countries.   
JEL classification:E51, D02, C33, O57 
Keywords: Non-performing loans. Institutional quality.  GMM estimator. Comparative 
analysis 
1. Introduction  
Non-performing loans curb economic activity, espicially in countries where financial 
institutions are the backbone of these economies. In other words, whereever banks are the 
main source of finance for economic agents, the financial market is the institution the less 
chosen by invetsors in order to finance their projects. Besides, non-performing loans are 
considered as « financial pollution » (Zeng ,2012)  due to their adverse impact on economic 
growth. They are also deemed as an important determinant of banking instability.  In fact, an 
augmentation of NPL causes a deterioration of the loan quality and financial system 
instability (Atoi, 2018).   The important effect of non-performing loans, espicially on 
economic growth, has pushed many researchers to anlayze them from different viewpoints. 
Many studies have investigated the determinants of non-performing loans in different 
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countries (Boudriga et al. (2010) ; Abid et al., 2014 Gan Sun, 2018 ; Kumar et al. ,2018 ; 
Memdani, 2017). This stream of literature has explored these drivers seperately.  However, 
little attention has been paid to the effect of different factors on a disparate evolution of NPL 
in countries belonging to different regions. Therefore, in order to fill this void, this study 
explores the effect of institutions on non-performing loans (NPL) in the MENA and CEE 
countries.  
Inspite of the strengthening of their prudential regulation, banks in the MENA countries still 
suffer from a high level of non-performing loans (NPL).  For instance, during 2002-2006, the 
ratio of non-performing loans in perecentage of gross loans exceeded 20% in the Middle East 
and North African countries (Tunisia and Egypt).  As a consequence, non-performing loans 
prevents banks from making profits since they immobilize their capital and increase funding 
costs. On the other hand, when we look at the level of non-performing loans in the Central 
and Eastern European countries, we ascertain that after the global financial crisis (2008), the 
level of NPL did not exceed 10% in these economies.  In addition, and according to (Dhahri et 
al., 2012), the MENA and the CEE countries have different institutional endowements. The 
aim of this study is therefore to examine the effect of institutional quality on the evolution of 
NPL in these countries. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a 
brief literature survey on the determinants of non-performing loans. Section 3 describes the 
data and the empirical model. Section 4 presents the obtained results and the last section 
concludes the paper. 
2. Literature review 
According to the economic literture, banks’ specific and institutional factors are the principal 
determinants of non-performing loans.   
2.1. Macroeconomic determinants  
(Tanaskovic and Jandric, 2015) found that macroeconomic and institutional determinants 
increased the ratio of doubtful debts in Central and Eastern European countries and in the 
South-East of Europe during the 2006/2013 period. There is a negative relationship between 
the growth of the GDP and the ratio of doubtful debts. On the other hand, (Abid et al., 2014) 
have studied the effect of macreconomic and bankig specific variables on the quality of 
household credits accorded by 16 tunisian banks over the 2003/2012 period. They have found 
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that the growth of GDP negatively affects the ratio of doubtful debts.  In fact, a one percent 
increase of GDP causes a 0,040297 decrease of doubtful debts. For instance, Fofack (2005) 
has sought the causes of unproductive loans during the economic and banking crises that 
affected the sub-saharan African countries in the 1990s.  He found that real GDP growth is 
negatively linked to non-performing loans. On the other hand, in order to identify the 
determinants of non-performing loans, Klein (2013) studied the Central Eastern and South 
Eastern European banking sector. He found that the increase of the unemployment rate cause 
a rise of doubtful debts. As for Baboucek and Jancar, (2005), they quantified the effects of 
macroeconomic shocks on the quality of Czech banking loans for the period 1993-2006 and 
reported a positive correlation between unproductive loans and the unemployment rate. On 
the other hand, Quagliarello (2007) studied the evolution of non-performing loans based on a 
set of explanatory variables and showed that the increase of the unemployment rate has a 
negative and significant effect on the quality of the loan portfolio in Italy. 
2.2. Microeconomic determiants  
Barros et al., (2007) concluded that small banks have more opportunities to achieve good 
performance, while large ones are more likely to have poor performance. According to Jonghe 
(2009), small banks can extremely withstand adverse economic conditions. For his part, 
Chaibi (2016) examined the determinants of the deterioration of the quality of Tunisian 
banking loans over the 2001/ 2010 period. As a result, it seems that large banks lend loans to 
poor borrowers because they are guaranteed to be saved by the government in the event of 
bankruptcy, which increases the ratio of bad debts. 
As for Homrani, Ben Gamra and Abaoub(2013), they worked on a sample of 10 Tunisian 
banks during the 1999/2010 period and found that the provisions on bad debts are negatively 
related to changes in future earnings. The same finding was made by Beaver and Engel (1996) 
who showed that bank's performance is related negatively to normal loan losses and positively 
to abnormal loan loss provisions (unproductive). On the other hand, on examining the 
relationship between loan provisions and non-performing loan levels, Ahmed and al (1999) 
found that this is a positive relationship since an increase in loan loss provisions indicates a 
deterioration of the loan quality, thereby impairing the performance of the credit institutions.  
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2.3. Institutional determiants  
Applying different panel data estimation approaches on 195 developed and developing 
countries over the period 2000-2016, Gjeçi and Marinc (2018) found a positive and 
statistically significant relationship between corruption and non-performing loans (NPL). 
However, the impact of corruption on NPL remained dependent on the legal origin and on the 
type of the financial system (bank or market-based financial system).   
Administrative corruption (corruption of civil servants), including corruption of banks’ 
officials, has detriorated the quality of loans. In fact, banks’ officials violate the law and favor 
those who bribe them, which leads to the increase of the weight of non-performing loans. For 
their part, Morakinyo and Sibanda (2016) exploited static and dynamic panel data to analyze 
the main determinants of unproductive loans in the MINT economies (Mexico, Indonesia, 
Nigeria, Turkey) between 1998-2014 and showed that the relationship between corruption and 
dubious debt is positive. 
As for Tanasković and Jandric (2015), they analyzed the macroeconomic and institutional 
empirical determinants of growth of the NPL ratios for the CEEC and SEE countries over the 
2006-2013 period. The results showed that macroeconomic variables, such as the GDP, the 
foreign currency loan ratio and the exchange rates, are positively and significantly related to 
the ratio of NPL. However, the financial market development level is the only institutional 
variable stastistically significant and negatively related to the NPL.  
Boudriga et al. (2010) used a random effects panel model to study the determinants of 
unproductive loans and the impact of the commercial and institutional environment on non-
performing lending rates of 46 commercial banks in 12 countries in the MENA region. To the 
bank specific and macroeconomic variables, they have added institutional ones and found that 
corruption has a positive and significant impact on the growth of bad loans.   
 Covering fifty two countries during 2000, the study of Breuer (2006) concluded that legal, 
political, sociological, economic, and banking institutions contribued differently to the 
problem of bank loans.  Referring to the banking institutions, the author found that deposit 
insurance increases non-performing loans. However, economic institutions, such as fixed 
exchange rate regime, reduce the problem of bank loans. 
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Table 1: A literature review on the effect of institutions on non-performing loans 
Authors  Countries Periods Institutional indicators  Methods Results 
Gjeçi and 
Marinc (2018) 
 
 
 
195 
developed 
and 
developing 
countries  
2000-
2016 
Capital stringency                       
Rule of law                               
Democracy Index          
Regulatory quality 
Corruption indexes 
 
Different 
panel data 
estimation 
approaches 
Positive and 
statistically 
significant 
relationship 
between corruption 
and non-performing 
loans.                                        
The effect of 
corruption on NPL 
is more pronounced 
when the legal 
environnmet is 
weak and the 
economies are 
bank-based 
systems. 
Morakinyo 
and  Sibanda 
(2016) 
MINT 
economies 
(Mexico, 
Indonesia, 
Nigeria, 
Turkey) 
1998-
2014 
Corruption  Static and 
dynamic 
panel 
Positive relatioship 
between corruption 
and non-performing 
loans. 
 
 
Tanasković 
and  Jandric 
(2015) 
CEEC and 
SEE 
countries 
2006-
2013 
Audit                                  
Financial market 
development  
 
The static 
panel 
model 
approach 
Negative 
relationship 
between financial 
market 
development and 
the level of non-
performing loans. 
 
Boudriga et  
al (2010) 
 
12 countries 
in the 
MENA 
region  
 
 
2002-
2006 
The six world Bank 
governance indcators :                
-Voice and 
accountability                     
-Political instability and 
violence                                    
-Governement 
Effectiveness                             
-Regulatory quality              
-Rule of law                     
-Control  of corruption 
A pooled 
regression 
approach 
Negative and 
significant 
relationship 
between all the 
institutional 
variables, except 
political stability 
and governement 
effectiveness. 
Breuer (2006)  
 
 
52 countries  2000 Banking 
institutions :(Deposit 
insurance, government 
ownership, asset 
diversification….)  
Legal 
OLS 
estimation  
Deposit insurance 
increases non-
performing loans                                                              
Government 
ownership is 
significant and 
reduces problem of 
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institutions :(Legal 
origin, Law and order, 
lack of property rights) 
Political institutions : 
(Government stability, 
Voice)                            
Sociological 
institutions: (Ethnic 
fraction, income 
inequality, Corruption) 
Economic institutions :( 
Exchange rate regime, 
Fiscal burden,wage and 
price control 
bank loans.                                  
civil law countries 
are less prone to 
problem of bank 
loans than common 
law countries                
-corruption 
increases the share 
of bank assets that 
are non-performing 
loans                                   
- fixed exchange 
rate regime reduces 
problem bank 
loans. 
Source : Author 
3. Data and empirical model  
3.1. Data  
Annual data about 10 MENA countries and 11 CEE countries for the 1997/2016 period were 
obtained from the World Bank database.  This study includes data on : non-performing loans 
to total gross loans (NPL), Gross domestic product (GDP), inflation (INF), unemployement 
(UNE), financial crisis (CR),  return on asset(ROA), domestic credit provided by the banking 
sector (DCB) and six indcators that measure the quality of institutions, such as the Rule of 
Law (RL), Control of Corruption (CC), Regulatory Quality (RQ), Voice and Accountability 
(VA), Political Stability and Absence of Violence/ Terrorism (PS) and Government 
Effectiveness (GE). These indicators were extracted from the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI).   
 Rule of law (RL) and control of corruption (CC) represent the indicators of governance that 
take into account on the one hand, the degree of the agents’ trust in both the rules of the 
society and, the quality of contract enforcements and, on the other hand, the extent to which 
the government exerts its power for private gains.  
Moreover, the regulation quality (RQ) is another indicator of governance, which reveals the 
capacity of the government to formulate and execute efficient policies, and establish 
regulations that assure the development and the promotion of the private sector.    
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The Voice and Accountability (VA) indicator reflect the aptitude of the agents to effectively 
participate in the selection of the government (liberty of expression and association, media 
liberty). Political stability (PS) shows us how violent and terrorist acts disturb the 
government.  Concerning the indicator of government effectiveness, it measures the 
effectiveness of the government by evaluating the quality of public services, its degree of 
independence from political pressure, and its implementation. 
3.2. Empirical model  
In order to show how bank-specific factors, macroeconomic and institutional factors affect the 
ratio of unproductive loans in two different regions, we apply a panel data model on a sample 
of 10 MENA and 11 CEE countries over the 1997-2016 period.  The choice of these two 
regions is largely justified by the difference of institutional endowements. The object of this 
paper is to show that institutional quality matters for non-performing loans.  The model is 
presented as follows: 
)1(,,1;
1
0 tititi
K
i
iit INSTXNPL   
   
 
where the subscript i = 1, … , N denotes the country (in our work, we have 10 MENA 
countries and11 CEE countries) and t = 1, … , T the time period (our time frame is  1997–
2016). 
NPLi, t : The ratio of non-performing loans to total gross loans of country i at time t is the 
dependent variable.  
Xi,t  is the vector of the explanatory variables which include macroeconomic variables (GDP , 
INF, UNEMP), a dummy variable that takes  value 1 when there is a financial crisis and 0 
otherwise, and Bank specific variables (ROA (return on asset, Domestic credit  provided by 
the banking sector (DCB)).  
INSTi,t  is the indicator  of institutional quality, which is measured alternatively with the five  
governance variables (CC, RL, RQ, PS, and VA). 
εi;t is the error-term assumed to be independently distributed in all time periods of country i.  
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The model can be rewritten as follows: 
tititititititiitit CRDCBROAUNEINFGDPINSTNPL ,,6,5,4,3,2,110  
                                                                                         
where  GDPi,t  indicates the rate of economic growth 
 INFi,t : The inflation rate of  country i at time t. 
UNEMPi,t : The unemployment rate of country i at time t. 
ROAi,t : Return on Assets 
CRi,t : A dummy variable that takes value1 when there is a financial crisis and 0 otherwise. 
INSTi,t : Institutional variables were taken from the worldbank governance database (Control 
of Corruption (CC), Rule of Law (RL), Regulatory Quality (RQ), Political Stability and 
Absence of Violence/ Terrorism (PS) and Voice and Accountability (VA)).  
 We use the Generalised Method of moments (GMM) applied to panel data and more 
precisely the first step of the GMM system approach. This econometric method enables us  to 
control individual and temporal specific effects and address the problem of endogeneity. 
Besides, this method meets the need of the panel data study by providing solutions to the 
problem of simultaneity (the existence of bidirectional causality problem between variables).  
In this study, we estimate a dynamic model where the endogenous variables are introduced as 
explanatory variables with one or more lags). The dynamic version of equation (1) is 
formulated as follows:  
)2(,;
1
2110 titi
K
i
iititit XINSTNPLNPL   

  
The model can be rewritten as follows: 
tititititititiititit CRDCBROAUNEINFGDPINSTNPLNPL ,,6,5,4,3,2,12110   
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Where 1itNPL is the ratio of non-performing loans to total gross loans of country i at time t-
1.  
3.3. Tests :  
a- Hausman test: The Hausman test (1978) is the most common test that specifies individual 
effects. It is essentially intended to differentiate between fixed and random effects models. In 
this sense, this test is based on the difference between the coefficients of the two estimates 
(fixed and random), in other words, the difference between the (MCG estimator) and the 
(Within estimator). Therefore, the Hausman test compares the variance-covariance matrix of 
both estimators. Hausman’s statistics is: 
    WithinMCGWithinMCGWithinMCGH  ˆˆˆˆvar)ˆˆ( 1'    
In the case of a rejection of the null hypothesis (H0), the model is specified with fixed 
individual effects and the within estimator is the best one. However, if the null hypothesis is 
accepted, then the model is specified with random individual effects and the MCG estimator 
is retained.  
b-Panel unit root test : Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003) and Levin, Lin, and James Chu (2002) 
are the most common among panel unit root tests developed in the literature. These two tests 
are based on the ADF principle. However, they assume a strongly balanced data. For this 
reason, we have resorted to the Fisher unit root test, which can be applied to unbalanced panel 
data. According to Fisher unit root  test, all the series are stationary since the probability of 
this test is equal to zero for the whole variables and lower than 5%, which is in favor of 
rejecting  the null hypothesis ( all panels contain unit roots) and the acceptance of the 
alternative hypothesis. This result concerns the MENA as well as the CEE countries.  
c-Endogeneity test : The application of endogeneity test shows that the variables "Growth 
Domestic Product (GDP), Domestic Credit to the private sector by Banks (DCB) and Return 
on Assets (ROA) are endogenous. Nevertheless, the other variables, such as inflation (INF), 
unemployment (UNE), crisis (CR), and institutional (INST) variables are exogenous for the 
MENA countries. However, the result of this test is different for the CEE countriessince their 
GDP, DCB, CR, INF, ROA are endogenous while the other variables, such as (unemployment 
(UNE) and INST are exogenous. 
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4. Results   
4.1. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression  
According to the models institutional indicator (rule of law (rl)), the macroeconomic indicator 
(GDP) and the specific bank indicator (ROA) are negatively and significantly associated with 
the ratio of non-performing loans for the CEE countries.  These results are important since 
they show that these countries benefit from institutionnal soundness that contributes to the 
diminution of the non-performing loan ratio. Nevertheless, the specific banking indicator 
(DCB) is positively and significantly associated with the dependent variable. Financial 
development is in favor of the accumulation of the important portfolios of non-performing 
loans, in other terms, it is on behalf of the banking instability. Unemployment (UNEMP) is 
also positively and significantly associated with non-performing loans, whereas inflation (inf) 
and the dummy variable (Cr) are not significantly linked to non-performing loans.   
Concerning the MENA countries, inflation is negatively and significantly associated with non 
parforming loans, which means that a rise in inflation leads to a decrease in the amount of 
non-performing loans.  The bank’s specific variables are also negatively and significantly 
linked to the dependent variable. In fact, an increase in the return on assets contributes to a 
decrease of non-performing loans. Unlike in the CEE countries, the financial development 
variable (DCB) in the MENA countries reduces doubtful loans besides, the institutional 
variables, such as the “rule of law”(rl) and “political stability” (PS) are positively and 
significantly associated with non-performing loans. This means that the vulnerability of 
institutions in these countries causes the rise of non-performing loans. Moreover, the 
variables, “GDP” and  “UNEMP” are not significantly associated with doubtful loans.  The 
dummy variable “financial crisis” (Cr) is not always significant.  
 However, these results may suffer from some econometric problems, such as 
(heteroscedasticity, endogeneity). For this reason, we resort to the Generalized method of 
moments (GMM) method.  
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Table 2 : The effect of instututions on non-performing loans (fixed effects estimation)  
 Dependant variable : non performing loans 
Panel A : CEE country region  Panel B : MENA country region  
(1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
GDP -0,199 
(-1,93)** 
-0,163 
(-1,58)** 
-0,15 
(0,094) 
-0,174 
(-1,78)** 
-0 ,141 
(-1,37) 
-0,157 
(-1,52) 
-0.018  
 (-0,22) 
0,013 
(0,16) 
-0,007 
 
(-0,09) 
 
-0 ,034 
 
(-0,42) 
 
-0,0006 
 
(-0,01) 
 
 
-0,007 
 
(-0,08) 
Inf 0,004 
(0,76) 
0,004 
(0,86) 
-0,002 
(-0,50) 
0,002 
(0,62) 
0,004 
(0,87) 
0,004 
(0,96) 
-0,141  
(-2,10)** 
-0,136 
(-2,03)** 
-0,163 
(-2,34)** 
 
 
-0,142 
(-2,04)** 
 
 
 
DCB 0,07 
(2,89)** 
0,04 
(1,90)** 
0,08 
(3,94)** 
0,04 
(2,34)** 
0,05 
(2,24)** 
0,04 
(1,83)** 
-0,17 
 (-
7,86)** 
-0,158 
(-6,45)** 
-0,198 
(-8,58)** 
 
-0,17 
(-7,73)** 
 
-0,196 
(-8,61)** 
 
 
-0,183 
(-8,14)** 
 
 
ROA -0,988 
(-3,37)** 
-0,999 
(-3,36)** 
-0,958 
(-3,57)** 
-0,902 
(-3,20)** 
-1,086 
(-3,72)** 
-1,116 
(-3,79)** 
-2,60 
 (-
5,35)** 
-2,64 
(-5,45)** 
-2,85 
(-5,67)** 
 
-2,57 
(-5,29)** 
 
 
-2,97 
(-
5 ,94)** 
 
 
 
-2,89 
(-5,79)** 
 
 
 
UNE 0,684 
(5,94)** 
0,655 
(5,56)** 
0,629 
(5,90)** 
0,718 
(6,48)** 
0,685 
(5,90)** 
0,700 
(5,98)** 
0,160  
(0,86) 
0,144 
(0,77) 
0,139 
(0,69) 
 
0,153 
(0,82) 
 
 
0,09 
(0,47) 
 
 
 
0,0164 
(0,08) 
 
 
 
Cr  0,550 
(0,30) 
0,93 
(0,51) 
-0,07 
(-0,05) 
-0,560 
(-0,32) 
0,656 
(0,36) 
1,19 
(1,84)** 
9,84 
 (1,78)** 
9,06 
(1,64)** 
8,32 
(1,44) 
 
4,07 
(0,84) 
 
 
7,37 
(1,29) 
 
 
 
1,54 
(0,31) 
 
 
 
RL -6,15 
(-2,76)** 
     6,20 
 (3,81)** 
  6,53 
(4,02)** 
 
 
 
 
PS  -3,73 
(-2,13)** 
     3,32 
(3,78)** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RQ   -12,28 
(-6,52)** 
     0,235 
(0,14) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CC     -4,36 
(-2,19)** 
     2,12 
(1,98)** 
 
VA    -12,67 
(-4,87)** 
       2,49 
(2,01)** 
Const 1,87 
(0,84) 
2,46 
(0,99) 
8,64 
(3,66)** 
9,30 
(3,30) 
0,72 
(0,34) 
-0,414 
(-0,20) 
21,27 
 (7,78) 
21,59 
(7,94) 
23,69 
(8,45) 
20,29 
 
24,07 
(8,77) 
25,37 
(8,64) 
R2 0,3600 0,3497 0,4565 0,4084 0,3507 0,3342 0,5047 0,5042 0,4605 0,4989 0,4732 0,4630 
Observations  207 207 207 207 207 207 179 179 179 181 179 181 
Fisher test (p 
value) 
0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,000 0,000 
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Notes: the p-values  in parentheses ** indicate statistical significance at  5 percent level. 
4.2. The GMM System regression:  
Before presenting the estimates of the above-mentioned models, it would be interesting to 
present the test results. In fact, the null hypothesis of the Arellano-Bond test AR (1) is the lack 
of  autocorrelation of order 1, while he null hypothesis of the Arellano-Bond test AR (2) is the 
absence autocorrelation of order 2. According to the first and the second order errors 
autocorrelation tests AR (1) and AR (2) of Arellano and Bond, there is no autocorrelation 
between errors at different degrees.  
As for Hansen suridentification test, it confirms the validity of instruments since the 
probability of this test is higher than zero, which is in favor of the acceptance of the null 
hypothesis and the rejection of the alternative hypothesis according to which instruments are 
invalid. 
The finding of the dynamic panel-data estimation, the one-step system GMM revealed that 
non-performing loans positively and signficantly depend on their lagged value (doubtfl debts 
of the previous period (NPL t-1)) for the MENA and CEE countries.  An increase of 1 % of the 
lagged value of non-performing loans increases doubtful debts by almost 1% and 10 %, 
respectively for the MENA and CEE countries (tables 2 and 3).  The results of the estimation 
of tables 2 and 3 show that GDP has a negative and signficant effect on the dependent 
variable for the two sample of countries. An increase of 1% of GDP reduces non-performing 
loans by around 0,2 % and  0,1% for  the CEE and MENA countries. However, the UNEMP 
has a positive and signficant effect on non-performing loans for the MENA and CEE 
countries, which confirms the results found by Klein (2013) and Khemraj  and Pasha (2009) 
who also revealed a satistically positive relationship between  unemployement and  doubtful 
debts.    
On the other hand, the variable (INF) has a postive and unsignficant effect on non 
performaing-loans for the CEE countries but it has a negative and signficant impact on the 
dependent variable for the MENA countries.  These results are simillar to those obtained by 
Messai and Jouini (2013) and Klein (2013) who found respectively a positive and negative 
relatioship between inflation and non-performing loans. 
Hausman test 
(p value) 
0,0003 0,0001 0,0000 0,000 0,0236 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0001 0,0012 
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Moreover, bank’s profitability measured by Return On Asset (ROA) has a negative and 
significant impact on non-performing loans at 5% for the MENA and CEE countries. This 
result is consistent with the findings of Messai and al (2013), Abid et al (2014) who found 
that an increase of 1 % of the ROA reduces non-performing loans by 1.9% and 0.9%,  
respectively  for the MENA and  CEE countries while bank’s profitability increases the 
aptitude of banks to deal with credit risk and reduce non-performing loans. The dummy 
variable « financial crises »(CR) has a positive impact on non-performing loans (NPL) in the 
CEE and the MENA countries as it is shown  in tables 2 and 3. However, while such effect is 
not significant for the former, it is significant for the latter. This result confirms the important 
exposition of the MENA countries to external shocks, such as the Global financial crisis 
(GFC) of 2007-2008. Nevertheless, the non significant relationship between financial crises 
(CR) and the dependent variable for the CEE countries is attributed to the credit squeeze due 
to the GFC.  
Besides, in the CEE countries (table2), the results show that the coefficients of the 
institutional variables « rule of law » (RL) and « regulatory quality » (RQ) are satistically 
significant and negative at 5% level of confidence. These countries have reinforced the rules 
that strengthen the aptitude of the financial system to reduce the portfolio of non-performing 
loans, such as, rules that oblige borrowers to pay their debt.  However, the other institutional 
variables are not significant (PS, CC). Even if these variables are not significant, they have a 
positive effect on non-performing loans, while the variable (VA) has a negative impact.  
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Table 3 : Non-performing loans and the effect of institutions in the CEE countries 
 Dependant variable : non performing loans 
Panel B : CEE countries  
(1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
PNP T-1 0,57 
(9,53)** 
0,452 
(6,05)** 
0,546 
(8,22)** 
0,542 
(6,26)** 
0,578 
(8,02)** 
GDP  -0,269 
(-1,92)** 
-0,22 
(-1,69)** 
-0,292 
(-1,96)** 
-0,269 
(-1,81)** 
-0,297 
(-2,17)** 
Inf 0,03 
(0,79) 
0,013 
(0,36) 
0,057 
(0,97) 
0,026 
(0,65) 
0,013 
(0 ,32) 
DCB 0,018 
(0,86) 
0,04 
(1,85)** 
0,021 
(0,75) 
0,021 
(0,83) 
0,01 
(0,47) 
ROA -0,90 
(-1,65)** 
-0,909 
(-1,68)** 
-0,660 
(-1,35) 
-0,826 
(-1,52) 
-0,738 
(-1,49) 
UNEMP 0,21 
(1,83)** 
0,249 
(2,39)** 
0,351 
(2,22)** 
0,287 
(1,93)** 
0,257 
(2,16)** 
Cr  1,96 
(0,78) 
0,854 
(0,44) 
2,52 
(0,93) 
1,514 
(0,71) 
2,54 
(0,95) 
RL -1,68 
(-2,37)** 
    
PS   1,20 
(0,77) 
  
RQ  -5,90 
(-2,96)** 
   
CC     0,257 
(0,19) 
VA    -2,207 
(-0,96) 
 
Const 2,42 
(0,95) 
6,036 
(2,38)** 
-1,07 
(-0,28) 
2,62 
(0,73) 
1,27 
(0,40) 
Sargan test   0,696 0,553 0,696 0,606 
Arellano-Bond test for 
AR (1) 
0,029 0,017 0,035 0,031 0,034 
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Notes: The p-values in parentheses.  **, indicate a statistical significance at 5 percent level. 
The estimation results presented in table 3 show important results regarding the effect of 
institutional variables (RL, PS, CC) on the portfolio of non-performing loans in the MENA 
countries. In fact, an increase of 1 % of these variables increases non-performing loans by 
3.7%, 2.5% and 2 %, repectively. This result is quite logic since these countries are subject to 
institutional vulnerability. Financial institutions were governed by rules that did not give them 
the capacity to cope with different shocks (financial and political shocks..etc). A weak 
implementation of legal framework pushes these institutions to afford loans for politically 
connected firms, which causes an increase of the portfolios of non-performing loans.     
These results show that the financial system in the MENA countries still suffers from corrupt 
practices. The laxism of financial regulaion has encouraged financial institutions to adopt 
cosmetic accounting, which refers to the act of publishing documents that do not show real 
results. For this reason, additional efforts must be made so that an improvement of 
institutional quality will contribute to the reduction of non-performing loans. The other 
variables (VA, RQ) are statistically insignificant but positively related to non-performing 
loans.   
Table 4 : Non-performing loans and the effect of institutions in the MENA countries 
Arellano-Bond test for 
AR (2) 
0,497 0,473 0,454 0,494 0,494 
 Dependant variable : non performing loans 
Panel B : MENA  countries  
(1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
PNP T-1 0,697 
(17,20)** 
0,742 
(17,73)** 
0,687 
(13,93)** 
0,725 
(13,99)** 
0,734 
(19,07)** 
GDP  -0,115 
(-2,95)** 
-0,108 
(-2,49)** 
-0,109 
(-2,87)** 
-0,124 
(-2,99)** 
-0,108 
(-2,50)** 
Inf -0,186 
(-3,86)** 
-0,211 
(-4,02)** 
-0,143 
(-3,13)** 
-0,202 
(-5,18)** 
-0,223 
(-4,01)** 
DCB -0,045 
(-3,20)** 
-0,031 
(-1,70)** 
-0,03 
(-1,87)** 
-0,054 
(-3,57)** 
-0,038 
(-2,76)** 
ROA -1,90 
(-4,51)** 
-1,59 
(-4,73)** 
-1,63 
(-4,27)** 
-1,84 
(-5,67)** 
-1,67 
(-4,41)** 
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UNEMP 0,297 
(1,99)** 
0,327 
(2,42)** 
0,124 
(0,72) 
0,149 
(1,05) 
0,202 
(2,18)** 
Cr  16,35 
(4,15) 
19,5 
(6,43)** 
17,16 
(5,29)** 
17,10 
(6,12)** 
18,69 
(5,23)** 
RL 3,77 
(2,49)** 
    
PS   2,53 
(2,37)** 
  
RQ  0,663 
(0,37) 
   
CC    2,01 
(1,85)** 
 
VA     1,06 
(1,33) 
Const 5,79 
(2,77)** 
4,30 
(2,39)** 
7,11 
(2,83)** 
7,87 
(3,74)** 
7,05 
(3,59)** 
Sargan test  0,220 0,751 0,204 0,388 0,549 
Arellano-Bond test for 
AR (1) 
0,023 0,03 0,027 0,027 0,027 
Arellano-Bond test for 
AR (2) 
0,192 0,178 0,115 0,221 0,158 
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Conclusion  
On observing financial crisis episodes, we ascertain that many financial institutions have gone 
bankrupt due to the importance of non-performing loans which was attributed to a great 
exposition of banks to risks. However, a risk free taking by banks is due to the non 
compliance with the rules that ensure their stability because of institutional vulnerability.  
In this paper, we present the effect of institutional factors on non-performing loans for the 
MENA and CEE countries.  The choice of these two samples of countries is largely attributed 
to the existence of institutional difference between them.  To our knowledge, little has been 
done about the link between the institutional difference and non-performing loans. Therefore, 
this study tries to fill this gap by testing the effect of institutional factors on non-performing 
loans for these countries that have different institutions over the period (1997-2016). To do 
so, we have applied a panel data model on a sample of 10 MENA and 11 CEE countries.  
Moreover, the institutional indicator rule of law (rl) is negatively and significantly associated 
with the ratio of non-performing loans for the CEE countries, whereas it is positively and 
significantly associated to non-performing loans in the MENA countries. The “political 
stability” variable (PS) is also positively and significantly associated with non-performing 
loans in the MENA countries but it is not significant for the CEE countries. This means that 
the vulnerability of institutions in the MENA countries induces an increase of non-performing 
loans. 
Concerning the macroeconomic variables, the results indicate that the “Unemployment” 
variable (UNEMP) is positively and significantly associated with non-performing loans in the 
CEE countries but it is not significantly associated with the dependent variable in the MENA 
countries. In addition, the macroeconomic indicator (GDP) is negatively and significantly 
associated with the ratio of non-performing loans for the CEE countries but it is not 
significant in the MENA countries. Therefore, these conflicting macroeconomic results can be 
attributed to econometric problems, such as endogeneity. To deal with potential endogeneity 
of the explanatory variables, we use the dynamic GMM estimator. The empirical results show 
that the macroeconomic variables reveal the predicted sign. The variables (GDP) and 
(UNEMP) have a statistically significant effect on non-performing loans in the case of the 
CEE and MENA countries. An increase of the Gross Domestic Product reduces doubtful 
debts. However, the latter cannot be reduced when the rate of unemployement is so high.  
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These results are then in line with those found in the littérature by Babouced I and Jancar M. 
(2005). 
Our finding shows that institutional variables have different effects on non-performing loans 
for both samples of countries. On the one hand, we found that some institutional variables, 
such as political stability (PS) and control of corruption (CC)), are positively and significantly 
related to non-performing loans in the MENA counntries. On the other hand, other 
institutional variables, such as regulatory quality (RQ) and rule of law (RL)) are negatively 
and significantly associated with doubtful debts in the CEE countries. These results are 
relevant since they show which institutional variables have a significant impact on non-
performing loans for either sample of countries.  The MENA countries are characterised by a 
limitation of political stability, which fosters the adoption of bad practices by financial 
institutions.  In fact, political instability encourages banks not to respect the law and provide 
lending to politically connected people. In other terms, political instability (revolutions, 
electoral untrust..etc) increases non-performing loans, which amplifies corruption and ihibits 
financial stability as it also induces   an increase of non-performing loans. This is in line with 
institutional vulnerability from which these countries still suffer.  
Nevertheless, an institutional improvement marks the CEE countries and, as a consequence, 
non-performing loans are reduced. The improvement of the quality of the legal framework 
and its implementation in these countries have a negative effect on non-performing loans 
therefore, these countries must undertake some institutional reforms, such as a tight control of 
corruption through the payment of heavy penalties by those who are engaged in corrupted 
practices, which reduces corruption and non-performing loans.  
In additon, by referring to the bank’s specific variable, which is at the same time a financial 
development one, we found that the level of financial development is an important 
determinant of non-performing loans for both samples of countries. Therefore, the less 
developed the financial system in the MENA countries, the lower the portfolio of non-
performing loans is, whereas the more developped the financial system in the CEE countries, 
the more important non perorming loans are.  
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Appendix  
Table A.1 : Correlation Matrix for  MENA countries  
 
Table A.2 : Correlation Matrix for  PECO countries  
 
 NPL GDP INF UNEMP CR DCB ROA RL RQ CC VA PS 
NPL 1.000            
GDP -0.0854 1.000           
INF 0.0480  -0.0174 1.000          
UNEMP 0.2071   -0.0010 -0.0619 1.000         
CR 0.1673  -0.1086 0.4333 -0.0435 1.000        
DCB -0.1294   -0.0684 -0.3608 -0.0781 -0.1944 1.000       
ROA  -0.5429    0.3100 -0.2469 -0.2430 -0.4952 -0.2491 1.000      
RL -0.1150    0.0485 -0.1098 -0.0791 -0.0373 -0.2248 0.3290 1.000     
RQ -0.3221    0.1325 0.1055 -0.0742 0.0566 -0.1351 0.3947 0.6777 1.000    
CC -0.1625    0.0410 -0.1332 -0.0806 -0.0574 -0.0773 0.3622 0.8296    0.7018 1.000   
VA 0.1274    0.0402 0.1645 0.0229 0.1129 0.2414 -0.1505 -0.0965    0.0030 0.0158 1.000  
PS 0.0514    
 
-0.0185 -0.2588 0.0510 -0.0846 -0.2324 0.2555 0.7800    
 
0.5493 0.7382 -0.2347 1.000 
 NPL GDP INF UNEMP CR DCB ROA RL RQ CC VA PS 
NPL 1.000            
GDP -0.3613 1.000           
INF 0.0102 -0.0859 1.000          
UNEMP 0.3387   -0.0774 0.005 1.000         
CR 0.0076    -0.0109 0.0094 0.0568 1.0000        
DCB -0.0130  -0.3291 -0.1702 0.1101 0.0986 1.000       
ROA -0.3689    0.4621 0.3134 -0.1048 0.0026 -0.2440 1.000      
RL -0.2458   -0.0055 -0.1710 -0.0884 -0.0284 0.3933 -0.1493 1.000     
RQ  -0.4026    0.0747 -0.2249 -0.0067 -0.0468 0.3521 -0.0645 0.8136    1.000    
CC 0.2941    0.0636 -0.1457 -0.1556 -0.0514 0.3450 -0.0788 0.8847    0.7209 1.0000   
VA -0.3119    0.0760 -0.1315 0.0031 -0.0989 0.1853 -0.0490 0.8798    
 
0.8035 0.8557 1.0000  
PS -0.2339     0.0486 -0.1133 -0.0454 0.0087 0.1765 0.0139 0.6889    
 
0.5366 0.6393 0.7148 1.000 
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Table A.3 : Countries included in this study 
 
 
Table A.4 The list of variables and data sources  
 
MENA  
countries 
 
 
Egypt Arab Republic, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Turkey,  
United Arab Emirates 
PECO 
countries  
 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithunia, Poland, Romania,  
Slovak Republic, Slovenia. 
 Variables Data sources 
NPL The ratio of non-performing loans to total gross loans of the 
country 
The World development Indicators 
Database, World Bank   
GDP The Gross Domestic product in  % The World development Indicators 
Database, World Bank   
INF The inflation rate in % The World development Indicators 
Database, World Bank   
UNEMP The Unemployment rate in % The World development Indicators 
Database, World Bank   
CR The financial crisis dummy variable  that takes the value 1 
when it occurs and 0 otherwise.  
The IMFBanking  crisis database 
(2012) 
DCB Domestic credit  provided by banking sector in % of GDP The World development Indicators 
Database, World Bank   
ROA Return on Asset The Global Financial Development  
database, World Bank 
RL Rule of Law The Worldwilde  Govenance 
indicators Database, World Bank  
RQ Regulatory Quality The Worldwilde  Govenance 
indicators Database, World Bank 
CC Control of Corruption The Worldwilde  Govenance 
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indicators Database, World Bank  
VA Voice and Accountability The Worldwilde  Govenance 
indicators Database, World Bank  
PS  Political Stability and Absence of Violence/ Terrorism The Worldwilde  Govenance 
indicators Database, World Bank  
